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FORUMLESS: WHY VICTIMS OF THE
UYGHUR CRISIS SHOULD BE ABLE TO
VINDICATE THEIR CLAIMS IN
FEDERAL COURT
by: Chase Archer*
ABSTRACT
U.S. courts can serve as forums for victims of international human rights
abuses to litigate claims against foreign defendants. Oftentimes, U.S. courts
are the only option for foreign litigants who are unable to seek remedies in
their own countries or in international courts. This Comment discusses the
difficulties a victim of the Uyghur crisis would face attempting to use U.S.
courts to litigate claims against the Chinese government or government officials under existing law. The purpose of this Comment is not to address any
potential challenge to a claim but rather to address the claim preclusions common to foreign plaintiffs seeking to litigate international human rights claims
in U.S. courts. In light of recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the ability
of foreign plaintiffs to do so, this Comment argues that Congress should pass
legislation authorizing Uyghur victims to use U.S. courts as forums for claims
against perpetrators within the Chinese government.
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INTRODUCTION

In March 2018, Tursunay Ziawudun was told to report to a local
police station near her home.1 Once she arrived there, Chinese government officials told her she would be transported to a facility for
“more education.”2 Instead, she was taken to an internment camp,
where she was subjected to food deprivation, severe beatings, rape,
and indoctrination for a period of several months.3 Ziawudun is one of
over one million Uyghurs taken from their homes and forced into
camps as part of the Chinese government’s systematic campaign
against the Uyghur people, an ethnic and religious minority located in
the northwest province of Xinjiang, China.4 This Comment argues
that victims of the Uyghur crisis (“Uyghur litigants”) should be able to
use U.S. courts as forums to litigate claims against the Chinese government or government officials responsible for these heinous acts.
The United States has a significant interest in allowing non-citizen
litigants to use U.S. courts to litigate human rights abuse claims. Victims of human rights abuses are often left with no recourse within
their own jurisdictions to seek relief or recognition of harm. The
United States has a moral duty to allow victims to access federal
courts to seek justice that is not available anywhere else. Beyond
moral responsibility, allowing non-citizens to litigate human rights
claims is also in the strategic interest of the United States. In cases
where the U.S. government recognizes human rights abuses through
legislation or executive action, threat of lawsuit in the United States is
yet another tool by which the U.S. government can attempt to disincentivize such abuses.
This Comment first describes the Chinese government’s campaign
of terror in Xinjiang. Next, it discusses how Uyghur litigants might
bring claims in federal court5 under existing law, including the Alien
Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act
1. Matthew Hill et al., ‘Their Goal Is to Destroy Everyone’: Uighur Camp Detainees Allege Systematic Rape, BBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-china-55794071 [https://perma.cc/F78E-U9GF].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. This Comment does not analyze how foreign litigants might bring claims
against international human rights abusers in state court. For state court analysis, see
generally Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under
State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013).
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(“TVPA”). This Comment concludes that it is unlikely a Uyghur litigant could successfully bring a claim against the Chinese government
or officials responsible for the atrocities committed in Xinjiang. The
Comment argues that because current restrictions on both the ATS
and the TVPA limit the ability of foreign plaintiffs to sue human rights
abusers for actions that do not take place on U.S. soil, Congress
should pass legislation clarifying the ability of Uyghur litigants to use
U.S. courts as forums to seek redress against the Chinese government
or government officials.
II. THE SITUATION

IN

XINJIANG

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (“Xinjiang”) is a province in northwest China that is home to the Uyghur people.6 The
Uyghurs are a religious, cultural, and ethnic minority group native to
Xinjiang.7 While Xinjiang is officially an autonomous region where
the Uyghurs are entitled to some self-governance, the reality is centralized control by the Chinese government.8 Beijing’s interest in retaining control of Xinjiang is multifaceted and not discussed in depth
in this Comment, though those interests include Xinjiang’s history of
attempted insurrection against centralized control and its treasure
trove of strategic resources including coal and oil.9
The U.S. government has recognized that China is engaging in a
campaign of genocide10 against the Uyghur people that is calculated
to cement control over the region and eradicate Uyghur culture.11
Beijing sees Uyghur culture as a threat to the proliferation of HanChinese culture, which it hopes will replace Uyghur culture and, in so
doing, increase government control, force assimilation, and ultimately
quash dissent.12
6. Connor W. Dooley, Note, Silencing Xinjiang: The Chinese Government’s Campaign Against the Uyghurs, 48 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 233, 235 (2019).
7. Id.
8. See id. at 241.
9. Brennan Davis, Comment, Being Uighur . . . with “Chinese Characteristics”:
Analyzing China’s Legal Crusade Against Uighur Identity, 44 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 81,
89–91 (2019).
10. Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State,
Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://2017-2021.state.gov/determination-of-the-secretary-of-state-on-atrocities-inxinjiang/index.html [https://perma.cc/YPL8-AAS6]. This Comment does not analyze
whether the Chinese government is engaging in genocide because it is irrelevant to
claims under the ATS or the TVPA. For an analysis of whether the Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang meet the legal standard for genocide, see generally The
Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention, NEWLINES INST. FOR STRATEGY & POL’Y (Mar. 8, 2021) [hereinafter UYGHYR
GENOCIDE REPORT], https://newlinesinstitute.org/uyghurs/the-uyghur-genocide-anexamination-of-chinas-breaches-of-the-1948-genocide-convention/ [https://perma.cc/
UK97-PG6H].
11. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 235.
12. See id.
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The Xi regime is using draconian measures to achieve those goals,
namely cutting birth rates among Uyghurs through forced abortions,
forced use of intrauterine devices, and forced sterilizations.13 The government is also using omnipresent surveillance to identify and punish
dissenters.14 The surveillance is used to find Uyghurs and place them
in concentration camps where they are subjected to forced labor and
torture.15 The camps are also part of a reeducation effort to indoctrinate Uyghur people with the Xi regime’s political ideology.16 The Chinese government has also destroyed Muslim religious sites in the area,
called practice of the faith a “sign of extremism,” and banned the use
of the Uyghur language in favor of Mandarin.17
However, the situation in Xinjiang reaches far beyond the borders
of China. Reports show Uyghurs who are working in forced labor
camps are manufacturing products shipped and sold in the United
States.18 Companies including Coca-Cola, Nike, and Apple lobbied
against a bill that would ban imported goods from the region because
they were made through forced labor.19 While lobbying against the
bill is not an admission that those companies would suffer financially
if the bill was passed, there is significant evidence the companies benefit from the use of forced labor to create their goods. There are over
80 multinational companies20 in the United States that use, either di13. China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 28, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-newsweekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c [https://perma.cc/
7V86WFKQ].
14. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 235, 245–47.
15. See id.; VICKY XIUZHONG XU ET AL., AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POL’Y INST.,
UYGHURS FOR SALE 5 (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale
[https://perma.cc/EL8N-QDQV]; Ayse Wieting, Uyghur Exiles Describe Forced Abortions, Torture in Xinjiang, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 3, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/only-on-ap-middle-east-europe-government-and-politics-76acafd6547fb7cc9ef0
3c0dd0156eab [https://perma.cc/VG3D-B9TE].
16. Dooley, supra note 6, at 235.
17. Yasmeen Serhan, Saving Uighur Culture from Genocide, ATLANTIC (Oct. 4,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/chinas-war-onUighur-culture/616513/ [https://perma.cc/K266-2MCV].
18. Alison Killing & Megha Rajagopalan, The Factories in the Camps, BUZZFEED,
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/xinjiang-camps-china-factoriesforced-labor (Jan. 4, 2021, 4:26 PM) [https://perma.cc/M97J-WMGD]; Ana Swanson,
Nike and Coca-Cola Lobby Against Xinjiang Forced Labor Bill, N.Y. TIMES, https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/11/29/business/economy/nike-coca-cola-xinjiang-forced-laborbill.html (Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/EKL3-BNXY].
19. Swanson, supra note 18.
20. The 82 multinational corporations that the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
identifies as benefiting from forced labor in Xinjiang are as follows:
Abercrombie & Fitch, Acer, Adidas, Alstom, Amazon, Apple, ASUS, BAIC
Motor, Bestway, BMW, BMW, Bombardier, Bosch, BYD, Calvin Klein,
Candy, Carter’s, Cerruti 1881, Changan Automobile, Cisco, CRRC, Dell,
Electrolux, Fila, Founder Group, GAC Group (automobiles), Gap, Geely
Auto, General Motors, Google, Goertek, H&M, Haier, Hart Schaffner
Marx, Hisense, Hitachi, HP, HTC, Huawei, iFlyTek, Jack & Jones, Jaguar,
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rectly or indirectly, forced labor in Xinjiang for their goods.21 These
are major corporations with significant markets in the United States.22
Forced labor is so widespread in Xinjiang that no corporation manufacturing goods there can conclude their supply chain does not benefit
from forced labor,23 and no consumer can be guaranteed their goods
are not tainted.
III. HOW A UYGHUR LITIGANT COULD USE U.S. COURTS
FORUMS FOR CLAIMS AGAINST THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

AS

A. The Alien Tort Statute
The ATS grants federal district courts jurisdiction over claims where
a foreign citizen sues for a violation of the law of nations.24 The ATS
itself is not a cause of action; it allows federal courts to consider
causes of actions that foreign litigants bring under the laws of nations.25 This Section discusses the origin of the ATS as a vehicle for
international human rights claims, describes how federal courts currently apply the ATS, and analyzes how a Uyghur plaintiff could bring
a claim under the ATS.
1. Origin of the ATS as a Vehicle for International Human Rights
Claims
Enacted by the First Congress in 1787, the ATS provides that “[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the laws of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”26 Claims were almost never brought
under the ATS for the first 200 years of its existence, until the
landmark Filártiga v. Peña-Irala decision opened the floodgates to victims of human rights abuses to bring cases in federal court.27 Filártiga
was the first modern case brought under the ATS that allowed a nonU.S. citizen to use the jurisdictional statute to bring a claim against a
Japan Display Inc., L.L.Bean, Lacoste, Land Rover, Lenovo, LG, Li-Ning,
Mayor, Meizu, Mercedes-Benz, MG, Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Mitsumi, Nike,
Nintendo, Nokia, Oculus, Oppo, Panasonic, Polo Ralph Lauren, Puma,
SAIC Motor, Samsung, SGMW, Sharp, Siemens, Skechers, Sony, TDK,
Tommy Hilfiger, Toshiba, Tsinghua Tongfang, Uniqlo, Victoria’s Secret,
Vivo, Volkswagen, Xiaomi, Zara, Zegna, and ZTE.
XU ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 28.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
25. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 525 (4th Cir. 2014).
26. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
27. Ranon Altman, Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 111, 115–16 (2015).
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foreign actor for a violation of international law.28 In Filártiga, the
Second Circuit held that U.S. courts could be used to adjudicate tort
claims arising outside of its territorial jurisdiction.29 In doing so, the
court noted the “common danger” posed by the flagrant disregard of
basic human rights and noted that allowing U.S. courts jurisdiction
over such violations is an important step towards “free[ing] all people
from brutal violence.”30
2. How the ATS Is Currently Applied in Federal Court
Since the “small step” taken by the Second Circuit in Filártiga, U.S.
courts have taken several steps backwards, restricting the ability of
foreign litigants to use the ATS to bring extraterritorial claims against
international human rights abusers. The Supreme Court first restricted the use of the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.31 There, the
Court held that Congress did not intend the ATS to be a jurisdictional
grant allowing for all claims under the law of nations to be inducted to
the common law.32 Instead, the Court found that the First Congress
intended the ATS to have immediate effect, providing a cause of action for a limited number of international law violations.33 Ultimately,
the Court held that the ATS did allow for a narrow class of claims
under the law of nations.34 Such claims must be narrow, rest on a
norm “accepted by the civilized world,” and have specificity comparable to the original causes of action the First Congress likely intended
to recognize.35
The Supreme Court further restricted the use of the ATS by foreign
human rights litigants with its holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.36 There, the Court held the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS.37 The presumption against
extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction that states that
“when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,”38 reflecting that “United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”39 The canon is usually applied to
acts of Congress that regulate conduct; however, as a jurisdictional
statute, the ATS does not regulate conduct but allows federal courts
28. See id.
29. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
30. Id. at 890.
31. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
32. Id. at 724.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 725.
35. Id.
36. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 115 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255
(2010)).
39. Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
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to recognize causes of action well established in international law.40
The Kiobel Court went further than it did in Sosa, noting that concerns over judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is not
sufficiently addressed by limiting causes of action under the ATS to
those that are “specific, universal, and obligatory.”41 A claim under
the ATS can overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality
upon consideration of two factors: first, whether the conduct took
place outside of the United States; and second, whether the claim
“touch[es] and concern[s] the territory of the United States . . . with
sufficient force to displace the presumption.”42
Courts differ on how the factors should be weighed.43 The Second
Circuit maintained that if all relevant conduct took place abroad, the
presumption against extraterritoriality precludes the claim regardless
of how strongly the claim might touch and concern the United
States.44 On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit held that even if none
of the relevant conduct takes place in the United States, the presumption can still be displaced if “‘the parties’ identities and their relationship to the causes of action[ ]’ touch and concern the United States
with enough force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.”45 Thus, the meaning of “touch and concern” becomes the touchstone for the ability of foreign litigants to bring suits for human rights
abuses.
In Kiobel, the Court did not define “touch and concern” but did
conduct an analysis of the defendant’s conduct and its relationship to
U.S. territory.46 Other courts, including the Fourth Circuit, interpret
the touch and concern test to require a “fact-based analysis to determine whether particular ATS claims displace the presumption of extraterritorial application.”47 In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Technology, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held the plaintiff’s claims did displace the presumption because of its “substantial” ties to U.S.
territory.48
And while the Kiobel court did not define “touch and concern,” it
did define what must touch and concern the territory of the United
States—the claim itself.49 A claim is the “aggregate of operative facts
giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.”50 Importantly, it is the
40. Id. at 116.
41. Id. at 117 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
42. Id. at 124–25.
43. See Altman, supra note 27, at 115–16.
44. Id. at 127.
45. Id. (quoting Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 527 (4th
Cir. 2014)).
46. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25.
47. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 527 (4th Cir. 2014).
48. Id. at 528, 530–31.
49. Altman, supra note 27, at 128.
50. Id. at 128–29.
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aggregate of facts, not the conduct of the defendant, that must touch
and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.51
3. How a Uyghur Litigant Could Bring a Claim Under the ATS
A Uyghur litigant who suffered brutality at the hands of the Xi regime likely could use the ATS to establish that a federal court has
jurisdiction to hear the claim. Such a claim would need to establish,
among other things, a violation of the law of nations, overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality, and account for other potential claim preclusions.52
a. A Violation of the Law of Nations
The ATS grants subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts to consider non-U.S. citizens’ law of nations violation claims.53 Thus, a
Uyghur litigant would need to allege a violation of the law of nations
to bring a claim under the ATS. U.S. courts recognize as violations of
the law of nations systematic acts of torture because of the “universal
condemnation of torture in international agreements[ ] and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all the
nations of the world.”54 While not discussed in depth in this Comment, the systematic and severe campaign of torture, forced abortion,
sterilization, and forced labor against the Uyghur people, at the hands
of Chinese government officials, is well documented.55 These horrific
acts perpetrated by the Chinese government are clear violations of the
law of nations.56
The United States has recognized Chinese government actions in
Xinjiang that amount to violations of the law of nations.57 Congress
officially recognized the Chinese government violated the law of nations in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020.58 The executive
branch has made several similar determinations, including a recognition that the Chinese government is engaged in “the arbitrary imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty of more than
one million civilians, forced sterilization, torture of a large number of
51. Id. at 129.
52. This Comment only addresses those issues common to foreign litigants bringing extraterritorial human rights abuse claims rather than all the elements of a successful claim.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
54. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. Press Release, Pompeo, supra note 10; John Sudworth, China Uighurs: A
Model’s Video Gives a Rare Glimpse Inside Internment, BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53650246 [https://perma.cc/H5HM2ZWC]; Hill et al., supra note 1; UYGHYR GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 10.
56. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
57. Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-145, 134 Stat. 648;
Press Release, Pompeo, supra note 10.
58. Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act § 3.
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those arbitrarily detained, forced labor, and the imposition of draconian restrictions on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement.”59 Any of these actions constitute a
violation of the law of nations and, in the aggregate, serve as even
stronger evidence of a violation. Any Uyghur litigant who suffered
any of these acts could show Chinese government officials violated the
law of nations, thus establishing a cause of action.
b. Overcoming the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Claims brought under the ATS are subject to the presumption
against extraterritoriality.60 The presumption against extraterritoriality is a doctrine of statutory interpretation that presumes statutes are
not applicable on foreign soil unless Congress clearly intended otherwise.61 Thus, a claim cannot be brought under the ATS unless it overcomes that presumption.62 When determining if a claim can overcome
the presumption, courts consider whether the tortious conduct took
place in the United States and whether the claim touches and concerns the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.63
The first factor of the test will not weigh in a Uyghur litigant’s favor.
The Chinese government is conducting its campaign of torture, forced
abortion, sterilization, and forced labor in Xinjiang, not in the United
States.64 Thus, the plaintiff’s ability to overcome the presumption will
rest on her ability to show the claim touches and concerns the United
States with sufficient force. It likely does so.
A Uyghur litigant’s claim does touch and concern U.S. territory
with sufficient force to overcome the presumption against territoriality for two reasons. First, Congress and the President, through enacted
law, have already stated the United States has a significant interest in
the plight of Uyghurs.65 The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020
“direct[s] United States resources to address human rights violations
and abuses, including gross violations of human rights, by the Government of the People’s Republic of China through the mass surveillance
and internment of over 1,000,000 Uyghurs.”66 The Act imposed further sanctions on Chinese officials identified as responsible for the
torture of Uyghurs, including asset forfeiture and visa revocation.67
59. Press Release, Pompeo, supra note 10.
60. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013).
61. James Janison, Comment, Justifying the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality: Congress as a Foreign Affairs Actor, 53 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1 (2020).
62. See id. at 4–5.
63. Id. at 2; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25.
64. Press Release, Pompeo, supra note 10; Sudworth, supra note 55; Hill et al.,
supra note 1; UYGHYR GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 10.
65. Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-145, 134 Stat. 648.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 652.
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The enactment of the Act is a definite statement by the President and
Congress that the plight of Uyghurs is of grave concern to not only the
interests of the United States but also its territory. Congress, by revoking visas from Chinese government officials responsible for the
torture of Uyghurs, invokes a territorial interest of the United States
in prohibiting the perpetrators from freely accessing U.S. territory.
Thus, a Uyghur litigant’s claims of torture and forced labor would sufficiently touch and concern the territory of the United States because
of the interest identified in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act.
While Congress’s word alone should demonstrate a Uyghur litigant’s
claims overcome the “touch and concern” test articulated in Kiobel,
there is additional support.
Forced labor in Xinjiang camps is used to manufacture goods that
are sold in the United States to U.S. consumers.68 A Uyghur litigant
likely could overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality because of those manufacturing connections to U.S. territory and markets. The litigant could argue that the gross human rights abuses by
the Chinese government, including forced labor, touch and concern
the United States because of the likelihood that forced Uyghur labor
is used to manufacture and sell products and goods to the United
States.69 China’s use of forced labor creates a touch and concern both
to the national interest (opposition to slavery and forced labor) and to
the physical territory of the United States, as these tainted products
are shipped and sold in the United States.70 While it is impossible to
guarantee every manufactured product is ethically sourced, a Uyghur
litigant could argue the situation here is unique, as it is the Chinese
government itself rather than a negligent corporation that is forcing
the labor. These actions are essentially state-sponsored slavery.
The U.S. government has recognized this concern.71 In a 2020 order,
the Department of Homeland Security (the “Department”) withheld
release of a number of products and goods manufactured in Xinjiang
because they were made with illegal state-sponsored forced labor.72
The Department prevented release of any product made in the Lop
County No. 4 Vocational Skills Education and Training Center in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region because Customs and Border
Protection determined forced labor conditions were present, including
“coercive/unfree recruitment, work and life under duress, and restriction of movement.”73 The Department also blocked imports from four
68. XU ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. DHS Cracks Down on Goods Produced by China’s State-Sponsored Forced
Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2020/09/14/dhs-cracks-down-goods-produced-china-s-state-sponsored-forced-labor
[https://perma.cc/M6WV-LH72].
72. Id.
73. Id.
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other factories in Xinjiang that manufacture products ranging from
apparel and cotton to computer parts.74 The Department noted that
allowing goods created under such conditions into the U.S. supply
chain “undermines the integrity of [U.S.] imports.”75 Thus, the executive branch clearly articulated how the Chinese government’s statesponsored forced labor camps touch and concern the physical territory
of the United States: They poison the integrity of goods inside the
United States. The Department concluded that “American consumers
deserve and demand better.”76
Additionally, Congress is currently considering the Uyghur Forced
Labor Prevention Act, legislation that would “regard the prevention
of [atrocities like those in Xinjiang] as in its national interest.”77 The
bill, which passed the House of Representatives,78 explicitly recognizes the prevention of the Uyghur crisis as in the national interest of
the United States and further authorizes the prohibition of imported
goods manufactured using forced labor.79 This legislation, in conjunction with existing action taken by the Department, demonstrates a
clear “touch and concern” to U.S. territory sufficient to satisfy the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
c. Other Preclusions to the ATS
In addition to the presumption against extraterritoriality, there are
two other potential claim preclusions foreign human rights litigants
often face: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
If a Uyghur litigant sought to bring a claim against the Chinese government itself, they would need to establish an exception to the
FSIA.80 The FSIA established that “a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States.”81 While there are several exceptions to the FSIA, only the
commerciality exception, known as the direct-effect exception,82
would apply here.83 A plaintiff establishes the direct-effect exception
when the plaintiff’s claim concerns commercial activity that is carried
out outside of the United States but causes a direct effect inside the
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, H.R. 6210, 116th Cong. § 3(5) (2020).
78. Id. § 11.
79. Id. § 4(a).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330.
81. Id. § 1604.
82. EIG Energy Fund XIV, L.P. v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 894 F.3d 339, 345
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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United States.84 If a plaintiff can show the direct-effect exception to
the FSIA, the plaintiff can sue a foreign state.85
A plaintiff triggers the direct-effect exception when they show the
following: (1) “the lawsuit is . . . based upon an act of a foreign state
outside the territory of the United States”; (2) the act “was taken in
connection with a commercial activity” outside the United States; and
(3) the act “caused a direct effect in the United States.”86 A direct
effect is “one that follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity.”87 While a direct effect is not subject to a substantiality requirement to establish jurisdiction, it nonetheless cannot be
“purely trivial.”88
A Uyghur litigant could bring a claim for forced labor against the
Chinese government under the ATS and claim a direct-effect exception to the FSIA. The plaintiff would need to argue that (1) the Chinese government’s act of forcing the plaintiff to labor in a factory
occurred outside the territory of the United States in Xinjiang; (2)
that the act was in connection with commercial activity outside the
United States; and (3) that the commercial activity had a direct effect
in the United States. The first prong is evident; the tortious conduct
occurred in Xinjiang and not in the United States.89 To prove the second prong, the plaintiff would need to argue that the forced labor was
in connection with commercial activity. The Second Circuit defines
“commercial activity” as actions “by which a private party engages in
trade and traffic or commerce.”90 Under this definition, a foreign government’s act is commercial and subject to the exception if it is of the
same type of commercial act a private actor would engage in.91 In this
case, the act of forcing labor is a commercial act that private actors
can engage in.92 Private actors force millions of people all over the
globe into forced labor.93 Thus, the Chinese government is not acting
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Petroleo Brasileiro, 894 F.3d at 345 (quoting Republic of Arg. v. Weltover,
Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted).
87. Id. (quoting Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir.
1991)).
88. Id.
89. See XU ET AL., supra note 15, at 6.
90. See Zhen Song, Comment, Going for Gold: The Meaning of “Commercial Activity” in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in the Race for Buried Treasure in
Sunken Shipwreck, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1771, 1783 (2013) (quoting Republic of Arg. v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
91. See id.
92. As of 2016, private actors have forced over 16 million people into forced labor.
Int’l Lab. Off., Walk Free Found., Int’l Org. for Migration, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage, at 10 (2017), https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/
wcms_575479.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6GZ-5P3Z].
93. Id.
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sovereignly when forcing Uyghurs to work in labor camps—it is acting
commercially.
For the third prong, a plaintiff who was forced into labor by the
Chinese government could likely argue that that commercial act directly affected the United States. As discussed previously, many multinational companies directly use forced labor in Xinjiang for goods
sold in the United States.94 But for those goods’ assembly or manufacture at the hands of forced labor, they could not be sold to consumers
in the United States. Thus, the goods sold are the direct effect required to satisfy a FSIA exception.
The second major claim preclusion is the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Forum non conveniens precludes international human
rights claims in U.S. courts when another forum is more convenient.95
The doctrine itself is a discretionary device that allows a court to, in
rare circumstances, “dismiss a claim even if the court is a permissible
venue with proper jurisdiction.”96 The Second Circuit in Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. instructed courts on how to weigh the policy interest of providing a forum for human rights litigation against the
reality that the U.S. courts may not be the ideal place to do so—but in
effect are the only one.97
Courts conduct a two-step analysis to determine whether to dismiss
a claim for forum non conveniens.98 First, the court determines “if an
adequate alternative forum exists.”99 If an adequate alternative forum
exists, the court balances several factors to determine if those factors
weigh strongly in favor of the foreign forum.100 Generally, plaintiffs
are entitled to a strong presumption in favor of their choice of forum.101 Holding that the court should exercise its jurisdiction to hear
the claim, the Wiwa court considered the presumption of deference to
a plaintiff who is a lawful U.S. resident.102 While foreign nationals litigating in U.S. courts are entitled to no less favorable treatment,
greater ties to the chosen forum decreases the likelihood of a forum
non conveniens dismissal.103
In its factor analysis, the Wiwa court also considered that forum non
conveniens dismissal could “frustrate Congress’s intent to provide a
federal forum” for international human rights abuse cases.104 The
94. XU ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.
95. Jeffrey E. Baldwin, Comment, International Human Rights Plaintiffs and the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 749, 750 (2007).
96. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting PT
United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 101.
103. Id. at 102.
104. Id. at 105.
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court pointed to the TVPA as evidence that Congress intended for
U.S. courts to consider international human rights abuse cases, and
dismissal for forum non conveniens would make it more difficult to
realize that intent.105
Finally, the court considered international human rights abuse litigants’ difficulty in finding alternative forums.106 Central to forum non
conveniens is the idea that U.S. courts are not the best-placed forum
to hear the claim.107 However, as the court recognized, human rights
abuse litigants often face great difficulty in obtaining a hearing for
those claims in the country where the alleged abuse occurs.108 Thus,
courts should consider potential difficulties a litigant would face bringing the claim in the country where the abuse occurred in forum non
conveniens claims.
While courts in the Second Circuit have subsequently applied a narrow reading of Wiwa,109 limiting its application to cases invoking the
TVPA, a Uyghur litigant would likely survive a defendant’s attempt at
a forum non conveniens dismissal even under a narrow reading of
Wiwa. Further, even a Uyghur victim bringing a claim under the ATS
would allege violations that the court could recognize are cognizable
under the ATS or the TVPA. It is difficult to imagine that a court
considering a claim from a Uyghur litigant suing under the ATS and
alleging forced labor, forced sterilization, or torture would grant a forum non conveniens dismissal because the plaintiff failed to make
claims universally recognized as violations of international law. The
kinds of claims a potential Uyghur plaintiff would allege are like those
alleged by the plaintiffs in Wiwa, who sued under the ATS and not the
TVPA. However, the easiest way for a Uyghur plaintiff to ensure the
case would not face forum non conveniens dismissal would be to sue
under both the ATS and the TVPA.
B. The Torture Victim Protection Act
The TVPA provides subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts to
consider torture claims that occur outside the United States.110 Unlike
the ATS, the TVPA provides two causes of action.111 The first is
against “an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation subjects an individual to torture.”112 The second is against any similar individual who “subjects an
105. Id.
106. Id. at 106.
107. Id. at 101.
108. Id. at 106.
109. Baldwin, supra note 95, at 769.
110. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 notes).
111. Id. § 2(a)
112. Id. § 2(a)(1).
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individual to extrajudicial killing.”113 Under the TVPA, a Uyghur litigant who was subjected to torture or the legal representative of an
individual who was subjected to an extrajudicial killing could bring a
cause of action against the responsible Chinese government official.
The TVPA was enacted in 1992 to allow victims of official torture
and summary execution a forum to litigate their claims.114 In passing
the TVPA, Congress recognized that despite universal condemnation
of the practice, many nations around the world still engaged in torture.115 Congress hoped the law would provide a forum for victims of
torture and extrajudicial killings who are otherwise unable to seek
remedies in their own countries.116 However, because of severe jurisdictional constraints, it is extraordinarily difficult for a plaintiff to win
a TVPA claim.117 To win a claim under the TVPA, a Uyghur plaintiff
would have to prove the elements, overcome jurisdictional roadblocks, and overcome other preclusions common to TVPA claims.
1. Proving the Elements
Under the TVPA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant committed acts of torture or extrajudicial killing under “authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation.”118 The TVPA defines “torture” as “any
act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical
control, by which severe pain or suffering . . . , whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual.”119 It defines “extrajudicial killing” as “a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.”120 Further, the Act requires a claimant to “exhaust[ ] adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”121 Thus, for a TVPA claim
a Uyghur litigant must show the following: (1) a torture or extrajudicial killing (2) occurred under Chinese government authority or color
of law as an exercise of that authority or law, and (3) all remedies
available in China were exhausted.122
To determine whether the defendant’s alleged acts were torture, the
court will apply the expansive definition in the TVPA. The TVPA defines “torture” as follows:
113. Id. § 2(a)(2).
114. Michael J. Stephan, Persecution Restitution: Removing the Jurisdictional Roadblocks to Torture Victim Protection Act Claims, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1355, 1358 (2019).
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 1357.
118. Torture Victim Protection Act § 2.
119. Id. § 3(b).
120. Id. § 3(a).
121. Id. § 2(b).
122. See Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F. Supp. 3d 653, 665–66 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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(1) [A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other
than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental
to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing
that individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing
that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused
by or resulting from—
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind[-]altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind[-]altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality.123

Despite the exhaustive nature of the statute, courts must consider
whether the facts of a particular case meet the statutory definition of
torture.124 The acts in question must “reach a certain level of severity”
to ensure the conduct described in the statute is extreme and outrageous enough to be labeled torture.125 Critical is “the degree of pain
and suffering that the alleged torturer intended to, and actually did,
inflict on the victim.”126 Further, “[t]he more intense, lasting, or heinous the agony, the more likely it is to be torture.”127 Courts have
previously considered “kicks and blows to the face” and genitals and
pulled teeth as sufficient to show torture.128 Other courts have found
severe pain and suffering sufficient to rise to the level of torture.129 In
123. Torture Victim Protection Act § 3(b).
124. Stephan, supra note 114, at 1361.
125. Boniface v. Viliena, 338 F. Supp. 3d 50, 68 (D. Mass. 2018).
126. Id. (quoting Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 93
(D.C. Cir. 2002)) (internal quotations omitted).
127. Id. (quoting Price, 294 F.3d at 93).
128. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345–46 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
129. See Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 51–52 (2d Cir.
2014).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-3\TWL301.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 17

VICTIMS OF THE UYGHUR CRISIS

4-MAY-22

13:00

705

Boniface v. Viliena, guards pistol-whipped the plaintiff, beat him,
threw him to the floor, threatened him with imminent death while a
gun was held to his head, and then shot him.130 The court held that the
combination of the severe beating at the hands of several assailants,
death threats, and gunshot wounds that caused severe injury were sufficient to show torture under the TVPA.131
Because this Comment addresses a hypothetical plaintiff, there is
not a specific Uyghur litigant whose allegations can be analogically
compared to previous TVPA cases. However, there are multiple accounts from Uyghur victims inside the Xinjiang concentration camps
of individuals who suffered severe attacks at the hands of Chinese
government officials. Among them is Merdan Ghappar, a model and
dancer from Xinjiang who was taken to a concentration camp in
2019.132 There, he was forced to wear “a black head sack, handcuffs,
leg shackles[,] and an iron chain connecting the cuffs to the
shackles.”133 When he tried to remove his hood, officers told him they
would beat him to death if he did so again.134 He observed men
beaten so harshly that “the skin on their buttocks split open” and they
were unable to sit down.135 Another individual, Tursunay Ziawudun,
spent nine months in a Xinjiang camp.136 There, she was raped on
three occasions by two or three men.137 Another woman in the camps
was forced to strip other women naked, handcuff them, and leave
them to be raped.138 Ziawudun was then forcibly interrogated about
her husband as officers knocked her onto the floor and repeatedly
kicked her in the abdomen.139 It is estimated that about one million
Uyghurs are being held in similar camps.140 Thus, there is tragically no
shortage of potential claimants with similar experiences. Undoubtedly, the aforementioned Uyghur victims and countless others suffered conduct that rises to the level seen in Boniface where victims
suffered beatings and threats of death. A Uyghur litigant who suffered
similar brutality could show the acts were torture.
Next, a Uyghur litigant would need to show that the torture occurred under the color of law.141 A person acts under color of law
130. Boniface, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 69.
131. Id.
132. Sudworth, supra note 55.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Hill et al., supra note 1.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Jen Kirby, Concentration Camps and Forced Labor: China’s Repression of the
Uighurs, Explained, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/Uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang (Sept. 25, 2020, 4:52 PM) [https://perma.cc/
68X8-8HBN].
141. See Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F. Supp. 3d 653, 665 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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“when he acts together with state officials or with significant state
aid.”142 Courts have consistently held that when a military or police
official acting in their official capacity commits acts of torture, the acts
occurred under color of law.143
While the inquiry into whether an individual acted under color of
law is fact intensive and case specific, reports from Xinjiang show Chinese government officials are running the concentration camps.144
Specific accounts allege that Chinese government officials are responsible for the heinous acts.145 As detailed before, Merdan Ghappar was
beaten and threatened with death by Chinese government officials.146
Tursunay Ziawudun was raped, beaten, and interrogated by several
men who were also government officials.147 In both cases, several individuals, all wearing government uniforms and identified as state officials, committed the acts in question.148
Further, the U.S. government has concluded that the Chinese government, “under the direction and control of the Chinese Communist
Party . . . , has committed crimes against humanity against the . . .
Uyghurs.”149 Those crimes include “the arbitrary imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty of more than one million
civilians, forced sterilization, torture of a large number of those arbitrarily detained, forced labor, and the imposition of draconian restrictions on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression,
and freedom of movement.”150 A hypothetical plaintiff who suffered
torture at the hands of Chinese government officials would likely be
able to show that state officials committed the acts and they resulted
from Chinese government policy designed to suppress, repress, and
erase the Uyghur people,151 thus satisfying the second element under
the TVPA.
As to the third element, the TVPA states that “[a] court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”152 Thus, a hypothetical
plaintiff would need to show that any remedies available in China
142. Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 52–53 (2d. Cir.
2014).
143. See Warfaa, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 665–66; Chowdhury, 746 F.3d at 53; Kadic v.
Karadz̆ić, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995).
144. See Hill et al., supra note 1; Kirby, supra note 140; Sudworth, supra note 55.
145. See Hill et al., supra note 1; Kirby, supra note 140; Sudworth, supra note 55.
146. Sudworth, supra note 55.
147. Hill et al., supra note 1.
148. Id.; Sudworth, supra note 55.
149. Press Release, Pompeo, supra note 10.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 2(b),
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 notes).
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were exhausted.153 However, courts do not require exhaustion of remedies where they are “unobtainable, ineffective, inadequate, or obviously futile.”154
2. Jurisdictional Roadblocks
While the TVPA establishes subject matter jurisdiction to consider
claims that occurred outside the United States,155 a court would still
need to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant for a TVPA
claim to be successful.156 Courts can establish personal jurisdiction
over a defendant either through general or specific personal jurisdiction.157 Though not discussed in this Comment, general personal jurisdiction is almost certainly not available for courts to establish personal
jurisdiction over a TVPA defendant.158 Specific personal jurisdiction is
also exceptionally difficult to establish for foreign defendants in
TVPA cases. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, a hypothetical
defendant would need to have sufficient contacts with the forum state
to reasonably anticipate “being haled into court in the forum state”159
and to show that doing so would not disrupt “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”160 It is difficult to imagine that a Chinese government official responsible for torturing Uyghurs in Xinjiang could reasonably expect to be haled into court in the United
States to answer for those actions. Even Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for personal jurisdiction
over foreign defendants,161 requires the defendant to have “nationwide and worldwide contacts” so that the defendant would be at home
in the United States.162 The likelihood that an official responsible for
the torture of Uyghurs in Xinjiang would have sufficient contacts with
the United States to be at home here is slim to none. Thus, it is unlikely a U.S. court could assert personal jurisdiction over a hypothetical Chinese government official defending a claim under the TVPA.
While it is likely that a TVPA claim against a Chinese government
official would succeed on the merits, it is unlikely such a claim would
survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. A court’s
inability to establish personal jurisdiction over a hypothetical defen153. Id.
154. Stephan, supra note 114, at 1363 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 10 (1991))
(internal quotations omitted).
155. Torture Victim Protection Act § 2.
156. Stephan, supra note 114, at 1358–59.
157. Id. at 1368.
158. For a more in-depth analysis of how personal jurisdiction requirements affect
TVPA claims, see id. at 1363–70.
159. Id. at 1370.
160. Id. (quoting 102 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (2008)) (internal quotations
omitted).
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
162. Stephan, supra note 114, at 1372 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 154 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)) (internal quotations omitted).
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dant renders the TVPA unable to deliver on its stated purpose to provide relief to victims of the most heinous of acts. Unless Congress
amends the TVPA, it is unlikely the Uyghurs, or any other group that
suffered systemic acts of torture and extrajudicial killings, will find it a
useful vehicle to seek justice.
3. Other Preclusions to TVPA Claims
Like the ATS, the TVPA is subject to the FSIA.163 A congressional
report completed at the time of the TVPA’s passing shows that Congress intended the TVPA to apply only to individuals and not governments or their entities.164 Thus, the FSIA still applies to TVPA actions
and restricts the ability of plaintiffs to sue foreign governments.165 Potential exceptions to the FSIA are discussed in Section III.A.3.c. However, even if it were impossible to name the Chinese government as a
defendant, it still may be possible to sue a foreign government official—though, for aforementioned reasons, that effort would be similarly futile because it is unlikely a court could exercise personal
jurisdiction over a hypothetical Chinese government official responsible for torture.166
Next, unlike the ATS, the presumption against extraterritoriality
does not apply to claims brought under the TVPA. Discussed in Section III.A.3.b, the presumption against extraterritoriality is a “territorial constraint[ ] on common-law causes of action under the ATS.”167
The presumption against extraterritoriality does not automatically apply to statutory causes of action like the TVPA.168 Instead, the court
will analyze the statute to determine whether it gives a “clear indication of an extraterritorial application.”169 The TVPA creates a cause
of action for torture or extrajudicial killings committed by an individual of “any foreign nation.”170 Thus, the statute primarily addresses
conduct “occurring in the territory of foreign sovereigns.”171 As such,
Congress clearly intended the TVPA to have an extraterritorial application and not be subject to the presumption against
extraterritoriality.172
Finally, while the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be used
to dismiss a TVPA claim brought by a Uyghur litigant, it is less likely
163. Id. at 1359.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1380.
167. Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 50–51 (2d Cir.
2014).
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013)).
170. Id. at 51 (quoting Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No.
102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 notes)).
171. Id.
172. See id.
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to do so than a claim brought under the ATS. The doctrine of forum
non conveniens is addressed in Section III.A.3.c of this Comment. It
allows a defendant to dismiss a suit when they can show “an adequate
alternate forum is available” and convenience strongly favors dismissal.173 As previously discussed, it is unlikely a Chinese government
official defendant would be able to show a Uyghur litigant has an adequate alternate forum.174 The Wiwa court held that for claims brought
under the TVPA, there is a strong presumption against application of
forum non conveniens.175 The TVPA was passed to offer victims of
torture and extrajudicial killings a forum to seek justice for the atrocities they suffered.176 To deny that forum is inconsistent with the purpose of the TVPA.177
IV.

CONCLUSION

Neither the ATS nor the TVPA is likely to allow Uyghur litigants to
recover against the Chinese government or government officials for
the atrocities committed in Xinjiang. Uyghurs and other international
human rights abuse victims seeking to redress claims in U.S. courts
face an uphill battle given (1) high procedural hurdles like personal
jurisdiction and (2) substantive doctrinal issues like the presumption
against extraterritoriality or forum non conveniens. The Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence shows the Court’s increasing willingness
to restrict a foreign litigant’s use of federal courts to litigate human
rights claims, and it dampens the likelihood that current circuit splits
will resolve in favor of foreign litigants. Thus, any change in the status
quo likely requires an act of Congress.
Congressional action might be most appropriate given the significant foreign policy and political considerations inherent to claims
against foreign governments and their actors. Legislation that provides causes of action to specific international human rights abuse victims would be a sensible solution affording those victims a forum to
litigate their claims while also ensuring those opportunities align with
U.S. policy interests. In the case of the Uyghurs, Congress has recognized a U.S. interest in the Xinjiang crisis through passage of the
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020. The United States has also
recognized that the Chinese government is committing a genocide
against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.178 Given the broad political consensus that the Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang are atrocious,
there may be the requisite political will to pass legislation authorizing
173. Helen E. Mardirosian, Comment, VII. Forum Non Conveniens, 37 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1643, 1643 (2004).
174. See supra Section III.A.3.c.
175. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2000).
176. See id. at 100, 104–05.
177. See id.
178. Press Release, Pompeo, supra note 10.
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the Uyghurs to sue those responsible in U.S. courts. Congress should
pass such legislation, and the President should sign it. Uyghur litigants
should be afforded a forum to seek justice for the heinous atrocities
committed in Xinjiang. The United States can and should provide that
forum.

